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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Birch, the insured, must be "made whole" before Fire Insurance, the insurer, can keep a thirdparty recovery. This means Birch should be reimbursed for his entire deductible, not just a portion
of it. Further, the full measure of damages for damage to realty is replacement cost. The trial court
arbitrarily accepted the insurer's use of 5% "depreciation" to "nick" Birch for 5% of his deductible.
ARGUMENT
A.
FIRE INSURANCE CONCEDES THAT IT DID NOT RELY UPON ANY TORT RECOVERY
AMOUNT TO CAP THE SUBROGATION RECOVERY IT OWED TO BIRCH
Fire Insurance now concedes the obvious. The Fire Insurance adjuster who kept 5% of
Birch's deductible never offered the theory that Birch's subrogation recovery was capped by the "tort
recovery" amount. This was a theory concocted by counsel for Fire Insurance after litigation. The
actual numbers simply don't reflect that argument. Farmers now concedes that if Birch was only
entitled to keep 95% of the replacement cost of the fence and landscaping, that would have been 95%
of $7,732.91 (the replacement or restoration cost). That full tort recovery amount is $7,346.26.
According to Fire Insurance's briefs, anything above that amount would be a double recovery to
Birch, to which he would not be entitled. However, the adjuster gave Birch the full amount of
replacement, $7,732.91, less his deductible of $500.00, or $7,232.91. Then, Birch got 95% of his
$500.00 deductible from the subrogation recovery, or $475.00. So Birch actually ended up with
$7,707.91, not $7,346.26. The Fire Insurance adjusters obviously never understood Birch's
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subrogation to be capped at 95% of the replacement cost. They simply pro-rated everything. This is
clear evidence that Fire Insurance has an indiscriminate practice of pro-rating subrogation recoveries,
not applying some "tort recovery" cap on subrogation. Other insureds are undoubtedly losing a "prorata" share of their recovery, despite not being made whole on any theory of third party recovery.
But the fact that the tort recovery fell short of the amount insured is irrelevant. Birch paid a
premium for insurance that carried a contractually specified measure of recovery, i.e., replacement
cost. In other words, as between Birch and Fire Insurance, the contract set the maximum measure
of the loss, as a matter of contract, not tort. Birch bargained for complete indemnity up to that limit,
not indemnity up to the measure of tort recovery against some unknown third party. Fire Insurance
all but concedes this point, in admitting that "in appropriate circumstances, that would entitle him
[Birch] to be made more than whole, based upon the contract rather than the law of subrogation".
(Fire Ins. Brief, p. 10). Why that reasoning would not apply here is left unanswered.
B
UTAH IS A PRETTY, GREAT STATE
Fire Insurance may be a nationwide company, and so subject to varying rules in different
states regarding whether the insured or insurer bears the loss of an incomplete recovery in tort. Fire
Insurance cites cases from its favorite jurisdictions, which apparently include Iowa and New
Hampshire. However, Birch believes that Utah is a pretty, great state. That is why he lives here, and
not in Iowa or New Hampshire. Utah law is amply adequate to answer the questions raised in this
case. And Fire Insurance finds no Utah case law to back it up, ignoring the fact that no Utah case has
created a special rule for this situation where, coincidentally, the contractual measure of recovery is
-2-

not identical to the tort measure of recovery.
But even if we look at other states, Fire Insurance isn't necessarily given preferential
treatment. For instance, Fire Insurance argues the case based upon the law of New Hampshire, which
Fire Insurance claims adopts a pro-rata rule in "reduced settlement" cases.1 Utah is, on the other
hand, an "insured-first" state. But the Dimick v. Lewis rule was later clarified to apply to the rather
unique situation of a parent recovering as an additional plaintiff, for medical expenses, from which
subrogation would be allowed, combining with a recovery for a child, as a separate claim not
including medical expenses, from which subrogation would not be allowed. The Dimick court
required that the single recovery be differentiated between the parent's claim and the child's claim,
and subrogation allowed from the parent's claim only. See Roy v. Ducneuigeen, 532 A.2d 1388
(1987); Lutkus v. Lutkus, 1997.NH.2, for further application of the Dimick rule in cases of minor's
settlements versus subrogation by parent's health insurer. It is not clear that Dimick applies pro-rata
subrogation outside of unique circumstance of a parent's tort claim for injury to a child. See Wolters
v. American Rep. Ins. Co., 2003 NH.0000084, " . . . subrogation is generally not allowed where the
insured's total recovery is less than the insured's total loss [citing Dimick]".
C
THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE DOES NOT HELP FIRE INSURANCE
Fire Insurance continues to trot out the "common fund" doctrine. But Fire Insurance incurred
no attorney fees or other costs to be taxed from the fund before distributing the proceeds. And that

dimick v. Lewis, 497 A.2d 1221 (1985)("we are reluctant to apply either an insured-first
or an insurer-first rule").
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isn't even the point; the question is who gets the money after any costs and attorney fees are taxed
to the fund. Even if Fire Insurance is entitled to deduct the "cost of producing the fund" from the
recovery from the tort-feasor,2 the next $500.00 after collection costs should have gone to Birch. The
relationship between the parties is not a joint venture in collections; it is not a business partnership
with equal obligations; it is not a marriage with equal division of property. The rules are clear: the
insured comes first. Once the insured is made whole, then the insurer gets to keep recovery. Fire
Insurance should have kept all but $500.00. Birch would then have been made whole. On the other
hand, if Birch had to go to the bother of suit, and settled for the same amount as Fire Insurance did,
under the authorities cited, the third-party recovery would have been taxed for costs (including
attorney fees) and Birch would then have gotten the next $500.00. Then, and only then, would Fire
Insurance have gotten the rest. While Fire Insurance came out ahead by handling subrogation on its
own, that did not entitle it to ignore the priority of the insured in keeping the recovery. Fire Insurance
has produced NO policy language allowing it to give priority to itself in disbursing any recovery, and
NO policy language allowing allocation, and NO policy language allowing it to assess "collection"
costs ahead of making its insured whole.
This is what happens on the flip side, when the insured carries the ball and obtains a
recovery. After the attorney fees and costs are taxed against the fund, THEN the party entitled to
priority gets all the money, until they are made whole. See Anderson v. UPS, 2004 UT 57,

P.3d

where the insurer got all the money AFTER the fund was taxed for attorney fees and costs.

2

Birch does NOT agree with this assumption, but it is irrelevant to this case.
-4-

,

D
THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN ALLOCATION OF PROCEEDS
Fire Insurance also attempts to slice the case up into two portions, an insured portion, and
an uninsured portion, and to require an "allocation". But this case involves a single loss, which is
damage to a fence and landscaping. All that the deductible does is limit Fire Insurance's payment,
but does not change the loss into two losses, one insured and one not insured. If Birch had had his
truck damaged, which was not insured by Fire Insurance, as well as a fence, which was insured, then
we might be talking about an allocation issue. However, this case does not involve multiple losses.3
Even if it did, the Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988) case clearly
involved payments of both insured (property damage) losses and uninsured (bodily injury) losses.
State Farm was denied recovery of any portion of the recovery against the third-party, which
recovery extinguished both the bodily injury claims (which State Farm did not pay) and the property
damage claims (which State Farm did pay) against the third-party. State Farm was not allowed to
subrogate or to ALLOCATE the recovery in any way, and not allowed subrogation unless it could
prove a double recovery. This would require finding that $50,000.00 fully compensated the parents
for BOTH the damaged car AND the death of their child. Fire Insurance's argument is directly
contrary to Hill.

3

Birch does not believe that this would make a difference under Utah subrogation law, but
there is no need to press that question; it simply isn't present in this case arising from a single,
insured item of damaged property.
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E
FIRE INSURANCE CONCEDES THAT REPLACEMENT COST
IS THE TORT MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The trial court's ruling was that Birch was only entitled to keep an amount equal to the
recovery of damages in tort. The trial court simply assumed that it was undisputed that 95% of the
cost of replacement or restoration equaled the full recovery of tort damages for destruction of fixtures
and damage to realty, by application of a 5% discount for "depreciation". Birch pointed out that the
tort measure of damages to realty is ordinarily the cost of repair or restoration. Marks v. Culmer, 6
Utah 419, 24 P. 528, 531 (1890)("the property [a building] being of such a nature that it could be
readily reproduced [i]ts value to the plaintiffs would be what it would cost to reproduce it, and the
value of its use while that was being done").4 Fire Insurance basically concedes this point, by
pointing to the additional authority of Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Fire
Insurance offered no evidence below that would indicate that the diminution in the market value of
Birch's property exceeded the cost of restoration.
The short, simple rule is that the insured gets first-dollar from any third-party recovery, in
the absence of statute or contract, until the insured has been fully compensated for his loss. Because
the insured has contract and paid for complete indemnification, any risk of loss or shortfall is borne
by the insurer.

4

Unlike automobiles, real estate (including landscaping and fences) do not necessarily
depreciate once purchased. The usual belief is that landscaping and fences add value, and do not
depreciate. Fire Insurance offered no evidence to support its claim for application of depreciation
in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Fire Insurance cannot stand first in line in dividing up a third-party tort recovery. Fire
Insurance and Birch do not stand together, to share pro rata, either. Birch stands first in line, and
must be paid $500.00, his entire deductible, before Fire Insurance may keep any recovery. The
assumption by Fire Insurance that it was entitled to a 5% discount for "depreciation" was not
supported by any law or facts. The measure of damage for injury to realty is the reasonable cost of
restoration. Fire Insurance was not entitled to create a new rule, nor was the trial court. This matter
should be reversed and remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in Birch's favor.
DATED THIS 22nd day of February, 2005.

Daniel F. Bertch
Kevin K. Robson
Attorneys for Appellant

-7-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of

1 Of)

, 2005, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was mailed by U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, as
follows:
David A. Greenwood (1250)
Stephen T.Hester (9981)
BENDINGER, CROCKETT
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-8-

